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Abstract
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percent. Meanwhile, real debt held by Americans in their twenties and thirties was approximately flat.
Using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Consumer Credit Panel, we describe the extent
of this debt increase and the distribution of debt growth by loan type. Real per capita home-secured debts
held by older consumers show the steepest growth, though older borrowers have increased their
obligations in all major debt categories. For long-held debts, these developments lead us to ask how such
changes emerged: did older borrowers carry more debt through the Great Recession, after which access
to consumer credit declined for new borrowers of all ages? Alternatively, have loan originations since the
Great Recession favored older over younger borrowers? While our results indicate that the stock of longheld, home-secured debt sits largely with older borrowers, we also uncover evidence of a decisive tilt of
new auto and mortgage originations away from younger borrowers and toward borrowers in their fifties,
sixties, and even seventies. The motivation behind older consumers’ substantial new borrowing, often
with long repayment terms, is the focus of ongoing research.
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Chapter 3
The Graying of American Debt
Meta Brown, Donghoon Lee, Joelle Scally,
and Wilbert van der Klaauw

As the US population ages, older Americans are reshaping the face of
consumer debt. In this chapter, we use the New York Fed Consumer Credit
Panel (CCP), based on Equifax credit report data, to look at how debt is
changing as Baby Boomers reach retirement and Millennials ﬁnd their
footing. We ﬁnd that aggregate debt balances held by younger borrowers
essentially remained constant from 2003 to 2017, but their portfolio had
moved away from mortgage, auto, and credit card debt toward student debt.
Debt held by borrowers between the ages of 55 and 80, however, increased
by 87 percent in real terms over the same time period. This shifting of debt
from younger to older borrowers is of obvious relevance to markets fueled
by consumer credit. It is also relevant from a loan performance perspective,
as consumer debt payments are being made by older debtors than in past
decades.
To understand such marked growth in debt held later in life, one must
consider the composition of older borrowers’ obligations. In CCP data, we
break per capita debt balances for consumers under 35 and over 64 years of
age into home-secured, auto, education, and card debt. While auto and
home-secured debt for those under 35 declined substantially from 2003 to
2017, education debt increased dramatically. Young consumers’ debt portfolios showed a similar overall per capita balance in 2003 and 2017, and yet
underlying this was a decisive reallocation away from debt secured by large
assets and into substantial amounts of education debt. Consumers and 65+,
however, showed no similar reallocation of debt. Instead, we observe growth
in per capita consumer debt from 2003 through 2007, and then a further
increase in per capita debt by 2017. This growth is evident in the balances of
most standard consumer debts for retirement-age individuals, and most
noteworthy in residential and auto debt. Real per capita residential debt
among those 65+ in the CCP grew by 89 percent from 2003 to 2017, and real
per capita auto debt by 69 percent. Hence, as young consumers backed away
from debt secured by large assets, older consumers appear to have propped
up demand in home and auto loan markets. Widely reported evidence of a
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gradual recovery of these consumer debt markets toward pre-recession
levels masked a combination of younger consumers’ waning participation
in housing and auto markets and older consumers’ increasing reliance on
secured debt well into retirement (New York Fed 2017; Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) 2017; Davidson 2017; Berry 2017).
But what sort of housing consumption rationalizes such a climb in residential debt among retirees? For answers, we turn to the Federal Reserve Board’s
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).1 In determining the uses of debt, survey
data are helpful, and the SCF particularly so. We again analyze the composition of real per capita debt growth among younger and older Americans
using the SCF and, despite some well-known dissimilarities between CCP and
SCF debt measures, by and large, we ﬁnd similar patterns (Brown et al. 2015).
Further, the self-reported purposes of residential mortgages in the SCF allow
us to separate debt secured by the primary residence from other residential
debt secured by assets such as second homes, vacation homes, and land
contracts. This exercise demonstrates that, in real terms, both primary residence debt and other residential debt have grown substantially among households with heads age 55+. Per capita primary residence debt rose by $21,229
from 2001 to 2016 (68%), and per capita other residential debt rose by $5,417
(102%).2 Hence, this combined evidence from the CCP and SCF shows us
that most of the debt-climb among older households in recent years came
from growth in residential debt, and that more than a ﬁfth of this increase
arose from properties other than the primary residence.
Our next query concerns the path by which the economy has arrived at
this new circumstance, in which consumer debt is at least as much the
province of retirement-age households as that of young families.
A slowdown in all types of lending in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis may
have had the mechanical effect of raising the age of the average outstanding
loan, and the age of its associated borrower. At the same time, to the extent
that inferred creditworthiness correlates with age, tightening underwriting
standards may have affected access to new debt differently for younger and
older borrowers. We begin by establishing evidence from the CCP that
credit scores increase steeply with age among US consumers. Given this,
we turn to the age distribution of new originations of mortgages and auto
loans in, ﬁrst the early 2000s, and then in 2017 for news regarding the
relative contributions of a slowdown in lending and a tilting of new originations toward older borrowers to the overall graying of US consumer debt. We
ﬁnd evidence of both slowed originations and a tilt of new originations toward
older lenders in mortgage and auto loan markets, with the mortgage market
characterized more accurately by a slowdown and the auto loan market
characterized more accurately by a reallocation of new auto loans away
from young borrowers and toward borrowers in their 60s, 70s, and beyond.
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Next, a look at repayment reveals that, despite the growth in debt among
seniors, older borrowers have long been noteworthy for the reliability of
their debt repayment, and there is little or no evidence of a change on this
front. The rate at which borrowers’ debt transitions into severe derogatory
status in the CCP slopes downward steeply with age, and this relationship is
stable from 2003 through 2007 to 2017. A similar pattern emerges in SCF
households’ self-reported 60-days-past-due delinquency. These results hold
despite evidence from the SCF that the ratio of self-reported debt payments
to income is no greater for younger than for older borrowers over this
period, and within each wave. If the large recent increase in debt in the
hands of seniors is leading to new threats to household ﬁnancial stability, the
evidence of such threats does not emerge in the form of rising delinquency
and default. If anything, our ﬁndings suggest that the reallocation of debt
from risky younger borrowers to reliable older borrowers over the past 15
years is likely to portend improving overall repayment reliability for the
consumer credit sector.
Finally, though the above analysis paints a somewhat rosy picture of the
reasons for, and repayment performance of, this new glut of senior debt in
the aggregate, there may remain pockets of seniors struggling with consumer debt. To determine how more and less afﬂuent seniors are weathering new consumer debt, we perform heterogeneity analysis of debt levels,
growth, and repayment across the distributions of household asset levels and
neighborhood income levels. In the SCF, we ﬁnd that growth of debt
balances for households in the top two deciles of the household asset
distribution for those 55+ dwarfs the debt growth for lower-asset older
households, largely from primary residence and other residential debt.
Nevertheless, we do ﬁnd some suggestion of rising heterogeneity in the
ratio of debt to assets for older SCF households. Though the dollar increases
in debt for afﬂuent older households are striking, increases in the ratio of
debt to assets are marked only for older households in the lower asset
deciles. The rise in the ratio of debt to assets is evident for the second
through ﬁfth decile, but then remains near zero throughout the top half
of the asset distribution. The jump in the ratio of debt to assets for the lowest
asset households is largely attributable to a substantial increase in the ratio
of student debt to assets. Overall, the increase in debt for the lowest decile of
the asset distribution amounts to an increase in their total debt to asset ratio
from 0.33 to 1.02 between 2001 and 2016. The second through ﬁfth deciles
of the age 55+ household asset distribution show an increase in the ratio of
total debt to assets of 0.13, arising mainly from a growth in primary residence
debt relative to assets.
Having established these patterns in the distributional characteristics of
borrowing at older ages, we then compare the news for older households
with that for younger households. While combing through ﬁner cells of
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older households and adjusting our measurements serves to reveal some
signs of increased debt burden among the ﬁrst decile of the age 55+
household asset distribution, signs of struggle with debt are immediately
obvious for younger borrowers.
In what follows, we summarize ﬁndings regarding debt growth, originations, uses, repayment, and burden among older and younger consumers.
Additionally, in an Online Appendix we discuss recent developments in
aggregate borrowing at younger and older ages, summarize the related
literature, and detail the administrative and survey data on consumer debt
on which we build this study.3

Measurement and Empirical Findings
Rising per capita US Consumer Debt from 2003 to 2017
and its Components
A large increase in debt among retirees may mean different things depending on the type of borrowing they have done, and on whether the debt is
asset-secured or not. Figure 3.1 divides the CCP real per capita debt of
younger and older consumers in 2003, 2007, and 2017 into its component
types (all in 2016). In panel (a) of Figure 3.1, we see young borrowers
increasing their total debt from 2003 to 2007 by $7,280, from $30,876 in
2003 to $38,156 by 2007. By 2017, however, they returned to pre-crisis debt
levels, with a mean per capita debt of $28,315. Moreover, the composition of
their debt changed dramatically in comparison with both 2003 and 2007.
The lower segments of the bars depict the movement of housing debt over
the period, and we see that real per capita housing debt for the young
households increased from $19,465 in 2003 to $25,493 by 2007, but then
(a)
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Figure 3.1 (a) Composition of per capita consumer debt at ages 18 to 34, CCP
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.1 (b) Composition of per capita consumer debt at ages 65 and above, CCP
Source: Authors’ calculations using New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, Census,
years indicated.

reversed course to fall well below its 2003 levels by 2017, to $14,172. The
growth of the segment of the bar second to the top shows us the steady
expansion of per capita education debt over the period, from $3,212 in
2003, through $5,320 in 2007 to $8,080 by 2017. A noteworthy aspect of this
chart is the extent of convergence of education and housing debt per capita
balances among 18- to 34-year-olds over the course of 14 years.
By contrast, older borrowers spent these same 14 years boosting their
(real, per capita) reliance on housing, card, auto, and education debt. Panel
(b) of Figure 3.1 depicts real per capita debt balances by type among
individuals age 65+. The lower segments depict a steady rise of housing
debt, from $14,220 through $22,163 to $26,929. Note that, by 2017, mean
per capita housing debt among retirement-age Americans exceeded even
the peak housing debt observed for young consumers in 2007. This overall
rise amounted to an 89 percent increase in real per capita housing debt
from 2003 to 2017. It echoes the rising housing debt across three cohorts of
Health and Retirement Study respondents demonstrated in Lusardi et al.
(2018), the rise in housing debt among older CCP ﬁleholders reported by
Brown et al. (2016), and the rise in housing debt among older Americans
reﬂected in CoreLogic loan-level data in Trawinski (2020). But this was not
the only source of increasing ﬁnancial obligation among retirement-age
Americans: auto debt grew from $1,655 through $1,748 to $2,798 (69%),
and card debt increased from $2,669 to $3,114 (17%). Education debt rose
over the period even for retirement-age consumers, from a real per capita
mean of $69 in 2003 through $191 in 2007 to $727 by 2017. Unlike younger
consumers, older consumers have become more reliant on all four major
categories of consumer debt.
Though borrowing among older consumers increased across all debt
markets, the dollar amount of the rise in housing debt stands out, leading
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to questions regarding the sources of this extensive housing debt now being
carried well into retirement. Is this debt securing the primary residence of
the older household, or does it reﬂect vacation and second homes, which
may have very different implications for household ﬁnancial stability in
retirement? Is the debt assumed for older individuals’ and couples’ own
housing, or is it taken on to support separate or shared housing used by
children and other relatives? For answers, we turn to the SCF. Figure 3.2
depicts the composition of real per household debt reported by SCF households. Heads of households represented in Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 are age 18
to 34, while heads of households represented in Panel (b) are age 55+.4 The
long history and stable questionnaire of the SCF allow us to establish a
pattern of consumer borrowing over a longer window of observation, with
measures drawn from the 1989, 2001, 2007, and 2016 waves. The qualitative
patterns of debt use among younger households in the SCF from 2001,
through 2007, to 2016 closely resemble the pattern for young individuals
observed in the CCP in 2003, 2007, and 2017. The extension of the window
of observation back to 1989 does add one new insight. The drop in reported
housing debt secured by the primary residence (the lower segment of each
bar) from the housing boom peak in 2007 to the more recent balance in
2016 actually takes housing debt for households with heads age 34 and
under in 2016 back to a level very near its real per household level from
1989: mean primary residence debt among these young households rose
from $35,115 in 1989 through $44,014 in 2001 and $71,939 in 2007, then fell
all the way to $40,261 by 2016.5
By contrast, debt among older households in the SCF increased sharply
from 2001 to 2007 and then leveled off to 2016. Panel (b) of Figure 3.2
depicts changes household-level debt by type in the SCF that closely resemble the evidence for individual debt in the CCP over this period.6 In the
lower segments of the debt bars, we see the rise of debt secured by the
primary residence from $13,071 to a peak of $58,222 by 2007, and then
retreat modestly to $52,650 in 2016. The SCF allows us to follow debt
secured by other residences separately, represented by the top segment of
each debt bar, and its rise is particularly steep. Other residential debt
increases from $3,386 in 1989 through $5,297 in 2001 to $12,105 in 2007,
dropping slightly to $10,713 in 2016. Hence, just over a ﬁfth of the increase
in overall residential debt among older households between the early 2000s
and 2016 is seen, in the SCF, to arise from debt collateralized by property
other than the primary residence. Finally, much like the older CCP consumers, older SCF households increased their auto debt from 2001 to 2016
by 69 percent in real terms. Older households in both the CCP and SCF
boosted the dollar amount of their total debt balances largely through
secured borrowing against residences and vehicles, and the SCF data show

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/9/2020, SPi

The Graying of American Debt 41

2016 USD

(a)

100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

1989

Primary residence
Student

2001
Auto
Other

2007

2016

Credit card
Other residential

Figure 3.2 (a) Composition of per household consumer debt at ages 18 to 34, SCF
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.2 (b) Composition of per household consumer debt at ages 55 and above,
SCF
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, years indicated.

us that an unexpectedly large share of this growth arose from debt associated with properties other than the primary residence.

The Path from the Early 2000s to Today: Underwriting
Changes and Origination Ages
Next we ask how retirement-age Americans accumulated unprecedented
levels of consumer debt, particularly housing and, to a degree, auto debt.
Several potential explanations present themselves. One is the inﬂuence of
the tightening of underwriting standards in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis.
The impact of tighter underwriting on the age proﬁle of the stock of debt
can operate in two different manners. A slowdown of lending across the
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board, independent of new borrower characteristics, will result in a gradual
aging of the average outstanding loan observed in the population, and a
resulting aging of the average borrower. Hence, in seeking the source of the
observed graying of debt, we must investigate the extent to which mortgage
and auto originations have slowed for borrowers of all ages.
In addition, the creditworthiness of borrowers inferred from their credit
histories and (ECOA-admissible) characteristics is typically lower for
younger borrowers. Figure 3.3 depicts the median Equifax Risk Score by
single year of age using six separate panels of risk score observations for six
decennial cohorts. The cohorts were born, respectively, in 1940, 1950, 1960,
1970, 1980, and 1990, and so their scores were observed at different but
overlapping age ranges of ages in our 1999 to 2018 CCP panel.7 What we
observe is a steep positive association between median Equifax Risk Score
and age, across all cohorts.8 The median Equifax Risk Score at age 30 sits at
or near 645 for two decennial cohorts observed 10 years apart, while the
median Equifax Risk Score at 70 is near 770 for two cohorts. It is worth
noting that this inferred creditworthiness proﬁle, rather than appearing as a
850
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Figure 3.3 Median Equifax Risk Score by single year of age for ﬁve decennial birth
cohorts, 1999–2018 CCP
Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, years indicated.
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function of age alone, is consistent with age differences in repayment
success, measured in terms of number and severity of delinquent accounts
as well as bankruptcies, charge-offs, and foreclosures to be discussed below.
In other words, the age proﬁle of Equifax Risk Scores depicted in Figure 3.3
does not appear to be an artifact of credit scoring methods, but instead a
reﬂection of progress in debt repayment that characterizes the life cycle of
the typical consumer.
Given the evidence in Figure 3.3, we may expect tightening underwriting
standards to affect credit access differently for borrowers of different ages.
Younger consumers, with their lower median credit scores, would be
excluded from credit markets at higher rates than older borrowers. Therefore, a tightening of underwriting standards can be expected to lead not
only to a slowdown in overall lending and a resulting increase in the ages of
borrowers with existing debt, but also a tilting of new originations toward
older borrowers. This, in turn, would contribute to an increase in the share
of outstanding debt help by older borrowers relative to younger borrowers.
To assess these two explanations for the graying of American debt, we
turn to the age distribution of new originations early and late in the years
tracked by the Consumer Credit Panel. Panel (a) of Figure 3.4 depicts the
number of mortgage originations per capita by single year of age in the CCP
in 2004 and 2017. The number of originations observed in the CCP is
(a)
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Figure 3.4 (a) Mortgage originations per capita by single year of age, 2004 v. 2017,
CCP
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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denominated by the Census projected population at each year of age for
2004 and 2017, respectively.9
The mortgage origination age proﬁles in Figure 3.4 reveal the great
extent to which a slowdown in mortgage originations helps explain the
rightward shift of the borrower-age distribution of the stock of outstanding
mortgage debt. Overall per capita originations declined from 0.12 to 0.04
over 13 years, and the origination slowdown was sharper for people of some
ages than for others. Mortgages originated per capita among 30-year-olds
fell from 0.15 in 2004 to 0.04 in 2017. Over the same 13 years, mortgages
originated per capita to 65-year-olds declined from 0.10 to 0.05. (Note the
large difference in per capita originations to young families and to
retirement-age buyers in 2004, and their surprising similarity by 2017).
Figure 3.4 provides unambiguous evidence of a contemporary housing
debt landscape shaped by a pronounced slowdown in new lending and a
tilting of the remaining originations toward considerably older borrowers.10
Outstanding mortgage debt today is much older, on average, than it was 13
years ago, and new mortgage debt is also issued more commonly to older
borrowers, relative to young borrowers. All of this adds up to a far greater
share of outstanding mortgage debt in the hands of retirees, and less in the
hands of young families, than seen in the early 2000s.
(b)
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Figure 3.4 (b) Auto loan originations per capita by single year of age, 2003 v. 2017,
CCP
Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, Census, years indicated.
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The standard term of a ﬁrst lien mortgage is considerably longer than that
of an auto loan. Hence, as we seek to understand the shift of auto debt
toward older borrowers between 2003 and 2017, we may also expect to see
some evidence of changing ages in auto loan origination. Panel (b) of
Figure 3.4 depicts the number of auto loan originations per capita in 2003
and 2017 by single year of age, calculated using the number of originations
at each age in the CCP as the numerator and the Census projected population at each age as the denominator. The auto loan origination evidence is
quite different from the mortgage evidence. While per capita auto originations did indeed slow from 2003 to 2017 for persons age 22–66, for those age
67+, the number of per capita originations was actually greater in 2017 than
in 2003. The ﬁgure shows some slowdown in originations at young and
middle ages, but also a decisive tilting of new auto loan originations away
from younger toward retirement-age consumers. For example, while per
capita auto originations to 30-year-olds fell from 0.23 in 2003 to 0.16 in 2017,
per capita auto originations to 75-year-olds rose from 0.07 in 2003 to 0.09 in
2017. Hence we infer that the graying of auto debt arose more from a
reallocation of new originations to older borrowers, than in the case of
home-secured debt. Moreover, we see a similar increase in auto originations
from age 67+ when we look at per capita dollar originated. This ﬁnding is in
line with results indicating that retirement-age borrowers increased their
balances across a variety of debt types; it suggests that demand for new credit
in dollar terms increased from 2003 to 2017 at older ages.
By and large, the trajectory of credit scores and originations points to a
mix of mechanisms producing the graying of secured debt. Older consumers were better positioned to weather the tightening of underwriting
standards that followed the Great Recession. New originations slowed across
the board but presumably as a result of post-recession underwriting, it
slowed more for younger than older borrowers. A slower rate of issuance
of new debt led older outstanding debt to constitute a larger share of
the stock of debt by 2017. At the same time, the issue of new debt favored
older over younger borrowers in a way that had not been the case in the
early 2000s.

Delinquency and Payment Burden: How Do Retirementage Borrowers Weather their Greater Financial
Obligations?
In the absence of similar growth in income or assets at older ages, an
increase of 94 percent in the real debt in the hands of Americans age 50+
might be alarming news, as well as evidence of older borrowers struggling to
repay a debt burden nearly twice that of comparable cohorts just 14 years
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before. In this subsection, we look into the delinquency rates and payment
burdens relative to income of older borrowers in recent years, and compare
these with delinquency and payment burdens among older borrowers in the
early 2000s. Further, we review the evidence on the growth of the assets of
older households over this period and consider older peoples’ ability to
balance the debt growth described to this point.
Older borrowers are typically characterized by relatively stable households and income sources, at least in recent decades. It comes as little
surprise, then, that older borrowers in our CCP and SCF data experienced
less delinquency in repaying their debt than did younger borrowers. Panel
(a) of Figure 3.5 depicts the percent of outstanding debt balance that
transitions into a state of severe delinquency (more than 120 days past due
over the calendar year) for 2003, 2007, and 2017 in the CCP.11 These
delinquency transitions are shown by age group, from age 18–29 through
age 70+. The share of balance transitioning into severe delinquency declines
monotonically from 4.5, 6.5, and 4.6 percent for those at age 18–29, to 1.8,
2.6, and 1.5 percent for the age 60–69 group. This monotonic decline was
similar for each of the 2003, 2007, and 2017 calendar years. From the 60–69
age group to 70 and beyond, we observe a ﬂat rate of transition into severe
delinquency in 2017, but a modest uptick in the 2003 and 2007 agedelinquency proﬁles. This indicates that the relationship between transition
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Figure 3.5 (a) Age proﬁle of transition into severe delinquency, CCP 2003, 2007, and
2017
Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, years indicated.
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Figure 3.5 (b) Age proﬁle of the share of households 60+ days past due on any
consumer debt, SCF
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, years indicated.

into delinquency and age is a steeply declining one and also that it is stable
over time. If anything, the rate of transition into delinquency at older ages
improved modestly over time. This stable negative association between age
and delinquency is one factor contributing to the positive association
between age and Equifax Risk Score in Figure 3.3.
The lessons on delinquency at younger and older ages is similar in the
SCF, with the additional information on whether consumer debt reported
whether they were ever 60 or more days past due on any consumer debt.
This measure differs from the delinquency measure from the CCP in a
number of ways. First, it is borrower-reported rather than lender-reported.
This might lead us to be concerned that survey respondents may underreport, or otherwise erroneously report, their experiences of delinquency.
One observation that may be encouraging on this point is the fact that
Brown et al. (2015) found that SCF household survey respondents selfreported bankruptcy at rates that appeared quite consistent with household
bankruptcy rates measured in the CCP. This consistency was also relatively
stable from wave to wave. SCF household respondents who report bankruptcy experiences reliably may also report less severe delinquency more
reliably. Second, the SCF delinquency measure is an indicator for whether
any debt became 60 or more days delinquent, rather than a measure of the
delinquent share of balance. Third, the delinquency standard of 60 or more
days past due used by the SCF is more modest than the 120 or more days past
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due in the CCP. Fourth, the data aggregate delinquency to the household
level, as opposed to the individual level of the credit report data.
The self-reported SCF delinquency rate among households with positive
consumer debt behaves quite similarly to the rate of transition into severe
delinquency from the CCP. Panel (b) of Figure 3.5 reports the delinquent
share of borrower households by age of household head for 1989, 2001,
2004, 2007, and 2016. The stability of the negative association between
delinquency and age is striking. Delinquency rates declined steadily for
the below age 35 to the age 75+ group in each of the SCF waves. Households
below age 34 had delinquency rates of 9, 11, 11, 12, and 14 percent in the
ﬁve waves. Households age 75+ had delinquency rates of 1, 1, 1, 3, and 4
percent in the ﬁve waves. Though the delinquency rates of 65 to 74-year-olds
in 2016 were near the top of the ﬁve-survey range, at 4.5 percent, and those
75+ were higher in 2016 than in 1989, 2001, and 2007 (though not in 2004),
at 2.8 percent, the delinquency rates of older SCF households in 2016
remained low in an absolute sense and similar to the delinquency rates of
the older SCF households in previous waves. This is true despite the fact that
SCF households with heads age 65+ in 2016 were repaying debts nearly ﬁve
times the size of the debts owed by their predecessors in the same age group
in 1989. In sum, though Americans all carried higher levels of debt into
retirement, we see little evidence of rising delinquency among older borrowers over many waves of data drawn from leading administrative and
survey-based consumer data sources.
Our results might be seen as contradicting with those of Li and White
(2020) who also used the CCP. Yet the studies track different measures of
repayment success or ﬁnancial struggle. Li and White’s outcome measure is
the share of overall consumer bankruptcies (foreclosures) that involved
older borrowers. They examined formal default and focused on the share
of outstanding debt affected by formal default. By contrast, our CCP delinquency rates measure the share of outstanding debt that is troubled, and we
do so separately for each age group, given changing population shares.
Further, our measure encompasses both formal and informal default, as
we track the share of debt transitioning to 120 or more days past due over
the calendar year.12 Hence the CCP data may be characterized by both
modest declines in the share of outstanding debt held by older borrowers
that transition into severe delinquency, and modest increases in the share of
bankruptcies (foreclosures) attributable to older borrowers.
Our SCF delinquency by age ﬁgure points to one other factor that may
contribute to the apparent contrast between our ﬁndings and those of Li
and White. In Figure 3.5, we see older households in 2016 self-reporting a
rate of delinquency that is slightly high compared to prior rates (though not
the highest across the SCF waves), and younger households self-reporting a
rate of delinquency that is slightly low compared to prior rates (though not
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the lowest across the SCF waves). Elsewhere our CCP results have shown
improving repayment performance for younger borrowers in recent years,
as, for example, in Figure 3.3. Li and White are interested in the bankruptcy
and foreclosure rates of older relative to younger consumers. Hence we
expect that one contributor to the rising relative formal default rates they
report is the improving repayment performance of younger consumers.
Finally, there is some consistency across our two studies in terms of the
qualitative results regarding ﬁnancial distress by age over the years we study.
Li and White estimated a modest or null inﬂuence of the 2005 bankruptcy
reform and of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, on the relative formal default rates of
young and old consumers from 2000 to 2012. This seems in line with our own
observation of stability in the age dependence of delinquency over these
years. Li and White, however, found an increase in older borrowers’ relative
rates of formal default since 2012, when compared to those of younger
borrowers. Our heterogeneity analysis below, with its evidence of emerging
ﬁnancial struggle among low-balance, low-asset households in the SCF provides some complementary evidence regarding these recent developments.
The SCF is also useful for our purposes as, unlike credit report data, it
allows us to weigh changes on the debt side of the consumer balance sheet
against changes on the asset side. Figure 3.6 describes both the growth in
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Figure 3.6 (a) Mean household debt by age of household head, SCF 1989, 2001, and
2016
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.6 (b) Mean net worth by age of household head, SCF 1989, 2001, and 2016
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, years indicated.

household debt and household net worth from 1989 through 2016 in the
SCF. In Panel (a), we observe a rightward shift in the age distribution of debt
in the SCF similar to the rightward shift observed in the age distribution of
debt from the CCP. Panel (b), however, indicates that this debt growth at
older ages was dwarfed by the growth of assets at older ages. In 1989, the
peak of the age proﬁle of net worth in the SCF occurred at ages 55–64.
Further, the mean household net worth level at age 55–64 in 1989 was not
substantially higher than the mean net worth level in 1989 for age 45–54. By
2001, however, the net worth peak for age 55–64 became pronounced, and
it grew in real terms by 73 percent, from $574,000 to $993,000. At last, in
2016, we observe a far steeper climb of mean household net worth from
the younger age groups to its peak for age 55–64. The value of mean net
worth for this age group rose again, to $1,168,000. Most notably, where
net worth fell off sharply at later ages in the 2001 SCF wave, mean net
worth values in the 2016 SCF remained approximately ﬂat for the 55–64
age group and into the older age groups, at $1,066,000 and $1,067,000 for
the 65–74 and 75+ age groups, respectively.
Thus we see that as debt at older ages climbed to unprecedented heights
between the early 2000s and recent years, it was also balanced by similarly
unprecedented, and substantially larger, growth in assets at older ages. Like
the evidence regarding the evolution of payment to income ratios over time,
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the evolving age proﬁle of assets among US households helps to explain
older households’ ability to sustain and repay unprecedented levels of
household debt. This debt is rendered less consequential by the newfound
afﬂuence of today’s American elders.

Heterogeneity in Debt Changes by Socioeconomic Status
Up to this point, our analysis of debt accumulation, growth, and repayment
has focused on broad age groups. In the aggregate, debt growth was mostly
attributable to housing debt secured by the primary residence and housing
debt secured by other residential properties. In the aggregate, older households bore only modest debt payment burdens, and they were more successful in avoiding delinquency than their younger contemporaries. But
there is heterogeneity in older households’ ﬁnancial situations, which we
now examine by comparing delinquency rates of residents of high- and lowincome neighborhoods in the CCP, and between high- and low-asset households in the SCF.
The SCF allows us to identify differences in borrowing and delinquency at
older ages across deciles of the household asset distribution. Figure 3.7
depicts the 2001 and 2016 mean total household debt in the SCF by household asset decile: it reﬂects the debt of only households with heads ages 55+,
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Figure 3.7 (a) Mean total debt within asset deciles, ages 55+, SCF 2001 v. 2016
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.7 (b) Ratio of mean total debt to mean assets within asset deciles, ages 55+,
SCF 2001 v. 2016
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, years indicated.

and the asset deciles are determined for this same age group. Panel (a)
represents the mean level of debt in 2016 US dollars held by members of
each asset decile. Panel (b) reports the ratio of the mean household debt to
the mean household asset level within each asset decile.13
This depiction of overall debt enables us to pinpoint the subgroups
responsible for the lion’s share of the rise in the aggregate dollars of debt
held by older borrowers, and to identify which groups are increasingly
laboring under the burden of consumer debt, as their debt to asset ratios
rise to levels suggesting ﬁnancial instability.14 We ﬁnd that the large increase
in per capita debt dollars at older ages over the 2001 to 2016 period was
concentrated primarily from increased borrowing among members of the
wealthiest (9th and 10th) deciles of the household asset distribution. Moreover, their increase in debt arose predominantly from increased debt balances secured by primary residences and secured by other residential
property.15 Put differently, the bulk of the growth in debt held by older
Americans from 2001 to 2016 was attributable to increased reliance on
housing debt secured by higher-valued primary and other residential property among the most afﬂuent members of the household asset distribution.16
This evidence does not support the views of growing ﬁnancial hardship
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among all older Americans, but instead it indicates growing ﬁnancial advantage on the part of older Americans, accompanied by outsized recourse to
consumer credit markets. Younger borrowers, in contrast, are less favored by
stringent underwriting standards.
Nevertheless there is a group of older households who may be struggling
with increasing debt burden and the types of debts most closely involved:
namely, households in the 3rd through 7th deciles of the household asset
distribution, who experienced rising debt obligations attached to the primary residence. We are unable to distinguish clearly between ﬁxed and
adjustable rate mortgages held by older consumers in our CCP data.
Bucks and Pence (2008) showed that SCF respondents did report reliably
on other details of their home mortgages, but they were comparatively
unreliable in reporting whether they held ﬁxed or adjustable rate mortgages. However, following Lusardi et al. (2018), we note that the large
increases observed in the home-secured debt carried by middle-asset households into retirement do constitute a new source of retirement ﬁnancial risk.
Further, per Lusardi et al., such households’ ﬁnancial risk is exacerbated to
the extent that their debt contracts are vulnerable to interest rate changes.
The lowest decile of the asset distribution, despite its modest mean debt in
dollar terms, displays the largest jump in the ratio of debt to assets between
2001 and 2016. Panel (b) of Figure 3.7 shows a jump in the ratio of total debt
to assets for this group from 0.33 to 1.0. As is clear, the bottom asset decile
carries the highest ratio of total debt to assets, by far, among the deciles of
the asset distribution. Moreover, the burden of its debt at older ages relative
to limited assets grew substantially from 2001 to 2016. The analysis of the
lowest asset group’s debt changes by type of debt presented in the Online
Appendix reveals one noteworthy change: the dollar amount of the rise in
student debt among this group was equivalent to 55 percent of its total
household assets.
Our ﬁndings for lower asset households support the insights of Lusardi
et al. (2020) regarding the emerging dependence on high cost debt of older
socioeconomically disadvantaged consumers. Results presented in our
Online Appendix demonstrate the great extent to which the observed
increase in the ratio of debt to assets among the lowest asset decile in the
SCF was a product of reliance on unsecured debt (including both card and
student debt). Lusardi et al. demonstrated a rising reliance on high-cost
debt, in terms of interest and fees, among socioeconomically disadvantaged
older borrowers. Further, they detailed the contributions of ﬁnancial literacy, information, and behavioral biases to such high-cost borrowing among
older consumers.
In sum, the large dollar increase in debt among older households appears to
have stemmed from afﬂuent older households’ increasing reliance on primary
and other residential debt, balanced by a striking run-up in assets. Yet for
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households in the lowest decile of the asset distribution, the rising householdlevel ratio of debt to assets among older Americans was driven in large part by
an increase in debt, paired with a modest decrease in assets. Such growth in
debt burdens as a share of assets for the most ﬁnancially vulnerable older
households has been mainly due to their participation in the massive growth of
educational borrowing in the US between 2001 and 2016.

Heterogeneity in Delinquency Trends
by Socioeconomic Status
Another aspect of our results has to do with delinquency rates among older
borrowers in the CCP and SCF, where we see few signs of new trouble for
most older households. Figure 3.8 depicts the share of each household asset
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Figure 3.8 Share of households 60+ days past due on any consumer debt, household
head 55 and over, SCF 2001 v. 2016
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, years indicated.
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decile that self-reported being 60 or more days past due in any debt repayment, for both 2001 and 2016. With the exception of the fourth decile,
delinquency rates were quite similar across deciles in 2001 to 2016. Only the
4th decile showed a notable increase, and its delinquency rate topped out at
9 percent. Moreover, despite the debt to asset ratio spike, we see no suggestion that repayment deteriorated meaningfully for SCF households in the
ﬁrst decile of the asset distribution.
In the face of rising housing debt and, for the lowest-asset households, a
large uptick in the ratio of debt to assets, the low levels of delinquency
among older SCF households suggests that they are managing to repay
these large obligations near and in retirement surprisingly well. One
remaining concern, however, is whether these default patterns are rational.
Evidence thus far indicates that older borrowers repay reliably even as debt
obligations rise, as debt to asset ratios rise, and as they age into a stage of the
life cycle at which consumers’ access to credit has traditionally been of
limited importance. Accordingly, some failure to default may amount to a
suboptimal choice. Future work will focus more closely on delinquency and
default decisions as people age into retirement.

Conclusion
This chapter has documented the rise of consumer borrowing among older
Americans between the early 2000s and 2016–17. We observed an 81 percent increase in the dollar amount of debt held by Americans between age
55–80 from 2003 to 2017 using administrative lender-side data; in borrowerside survey data from 2001 to 2016, the increase in mean self-reported
household consumer debt among households with heads age 55+ rose by
$31,262, or 69 percent. There were also changes in the composition of older
consumers’ debt over the period, demonstrating mounting levels of credit
card, education, auto, and housing debt among older Americans. The
growth in secured debts was most rapid, however, with auto debt among
Americans age 55+ growing by 69 percent from 2003 to 2017, and housing
debt by 89 percent. Further, we ﬁnd that the housing debt growth was driven
by borrowing by the top half of the asset distribution, with debt secured by
other properties rising particularly for the top two deciles of the household
asset distribution.17
These results suggest that much of the rise in debt among seniors need
not be interpreted as causing ﬁnancial fragility in retirement. Connecting
this change in borrowing to the change in assets held by older households
over this same period, we observe that most older households’ debt was
well balanced by their assets. The age distribution of household assets
has, like the age distribution of debt, shifted substantially rightward from
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2001 to 2016; moreover, the growth in assets has been far greater than the
growth in debt for older American households. Accordingly, the mass of net
worth held by the US older population has now reached unprecedentedly
huge levels. This fact helps explain the resilience of older borrowers’ repayment reliability in the face of growing obligations. Our analysis of delinquency among older borrowers indicates little or no increase in delinquency
among older borrowers over the period. This is true in general, for seniors
living in both high- and low-income zip codes (in the CCP), and across the
household asset distribution (in the SCF). If the rise in senior debt were
leading to ﬁnancial struggles in retirement, evidence of this struggle has not
yet emerged in the form of delinquency and default. Older consumers
continue to repay very reliably.
Nevertheless, the population is heterogeneous. For the lower half of the
household asset distribution, the ratio of total debt to assets rose by more
than 10 percentage points from 2001 to 2016, and the rise was particularly
pronounced for the lowest decile of the asset distribution, from 0.33 to 1.02.
Much of this increase is accounted for by the entry into the student debt
market of the ﬁrst decile of the senior household asset distribution between
2001 and 2016. Hence, while our results suggest that the overall increase in
debt in retirement need not portend broad ﬁnancial trouble for seniors,
particular categories of loans are of concern.
Our evidence leaves many topics open for further study. As one example,
we observe increasing secured debt in the hands of older consumers, while
young students and families appear to have backed away from credit markets. This raises the question of differential access to credit early and late in
the life cycle, and of the changing nature of consumer debt in the twentyﬁrst century. Another example is the risen vulnerability to housing market
downturns. In particular, retirement-age Americans now hold unprecedented levels of housing debt, which could leave them more vulnerable to
future housing market swings than previous retirees. A third area of concern
is whether younger cohorts holding substantial student debt, and who have
been slow to enter into homeownership, will be able to save adequately for
retirement.
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Notes
1. CCP data offer a unique opportunity to track multiple (ﬁrst and second home,
mortgage and home equity) residential loans at the level of the individual or even
the household. However, the closing of repaid mortgages on primary residences
as borrowers age poses a (not insurmountable) challenge for tracking the sources
of residential debt among older consumers in the CCP. Loans for vacation
properties, for example, may begin to look like loans for primary residences.
2. For ease of comparison, all ﬁnancial variables in the chapter are reported in 2016
US dollars.
4. Note that we have widened the range of ages included in our treatment of older
households here, as the SCF sample is considerably smaller than the CCP, and we
sought to establish patterns based on a larger proportion of sample households.
5. Note also that balances in other residential debt are quite small for younger
households in the SCF.
6. The average total balance at the household level for each wave is greater than the
average total balance we ﬁnd for individuals in the CCP, which is to be expected
given the large proportion of US households containing either two or three
adults.
7. The Equifax Risk Score uses credit report components to establish a score value
that can be used to predict the relative probability that a consumer will default on
newly issued debt in 24 months. In this sense, it is analogous to the FICO score.
8. The risk score proﬁle of the most recent cohort, the 1990 birth cohort, lies above
that of the 1980 birth cohort for each of their ages of overlap. Potential explanations for this phenomenon vary, including the passage of ﬁrst the bankruptcy
reform (BAPCPA) in 2005 and then the CARD act in 2009, each of which
speciﬁcally inﬂuences the credit access or repayment options of either young
borrowers or student borrowers. In addition, this cohort holds more student debt
during the earlier ages being compared, which typically raises inferred creditworthiness in the years before repayment struggles emerge. Finally, we have long
observed markedly more successful repayment at early ages among this cohort
than among earlier cohorts.
9. The reader may note that we have moved from our previous study of the 2003
wave of the CCP to the 2004 data. Because 2003 was a boom year for mortgage
reﬁnancing, as a result of falling mortgage interest rates, the level of mortgage
originations was artiﬁcially elevated in 2003. As we examine the extent to which
mortgage originations dropped overall from the early 2000s to the more recent
CCP waves, the reﬁ boom might lead to us to conclude, spuriously, that the aging
of mortgage holders over the period arose from a stark slowdown in across-theboard mortgage lending. In order to avoid such false inferences, we look instead
at mortgage originations in 2004, when much of the reﬁnancing spike had passed.
Our qualitative ﬁndings, however, change little when we use 2003 mortgage
originations.
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10. We observe the same pattern when plotting per capita mortgage origination
dollars by age.
11. Transition into severe delinquency is calculated as the share of outstanding debt
that transitions into a state of severe delinquency, measured as a status of 120
days or more past due, over the course of the calendar year, divided by total
outstanding debt.
12. As noted by Drozd and Serrano-Padial (2013), the majority of default on
unsecured credit in the US is informal.
13. Note that this measure differs from an average taken across the individual debt
to asset ratios of the sample households. Patterns reported in the lower panel of
Figure 3.7, as well as in Figures A4 and A5 of the Online Appendix are similar
using the mean across individual households’ debt to asset ratios, with the
exception of the ﬁrst decile, in which 22 (5) percent of households in the ﬁrst
asset decile in 2001 (2016) hold zero assets.
14. Two ﬁgures provided in the Online Appendix are constructed similarly but
reﬂect the growth in debt within each asset decile broken into the standard
consumer debt categories. These ﬁgures allow us to locate the debt categories
most closely associated with the growth in debt dollars among older consumers,
and the categories most closely associated with burdensome debt to asset ratios.
15. Detailed ﬁndings on housing debt across the SCF asset distribution appear in the
Online Appendix.
16. Home equity reached record highs in recent years. See, for example,
Haughwout et al. (2018).
17. These ﬁndings are consistent with recent evidence that home equity in the US
has reached all-time highs in recent years. See Haughwout et al. (2018).
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